ISBN 0-7006-1050-2
338 pages

List of Illustrations; Abbreviations; Designation and Structure of Operational Units and Commands; Equivalent Officer Ranks; Preface; Acknowledgments; maps; photos; Notes; Select Bibliography; Index.

   Like fellow Kiwi Joel Hayward did with Stopped at Stalingrad, Adam Claasen has put together a comprehensive, engaging, eye-opening account of the Luftwaffe at war. Where Hayward gave us the definitive account of the German air war in southern Russia in 1942-43, Claasen does the same, or nearly so, for Luftwaffe operations in Norway. Hayward's book, also published by University Press of Kansas, placed high in our Top Ten voting for 1998 and Claasen's book seems poised to make a run for the same honor for 2001.
   Claasen opens his book by quoting Hitler's boast in 1942 that his successful invasion of Norway in 1940 would prove to be one of the two decisive events in the war, and noting the Fuehrer's harsh words for the failure of Germany's WWI leaders to take such decisive action during the 1914-1918 war. However, as the author immediately points out, the "decisive" invasion had never figured into Hitler's strategic planning and in fact throughout the opening months of the war Hitler desired and expected Norwegian neutrality.
   The first chapter of Hitler's Northern War reviews in much detail the factors which led to the decision to invade Norway, beginning with the geo-strategic concepts of Admiral Wegener's naval writings during World War I and in the inter-war years, theories which stressed the need for Norwegian bases for the German Navy in any naval struggle against the British.
   The same chapter then traces German interest in Swedish iron ore—and quotes telling statistics—and the importance of Narvik for maintaining access to that ore, and also mentions the often overlooked raw materials from Scandinavia and the Baltic states being trans-shipped to the UK by way of Norway in the early months of the war. Yet another factor in Hitler's growing interest in Norway, according to Claasen, derived from Nazi racial theories linking Scandinavians and Germans.
   On 13 December 1939 Hitler ordered the first study of possible operations versus Norway. On 10 January 1940 "Studie Nord" was released and recommended a preemptive strike. Admiral Raeder, the strongest proponent of invasion, added his support to the study's recommendations despite disagreement by members of his staff who thought Allied violation of neutral Norway unlikely. Of course, led by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty at that time, the Allies were moving to execute exactly that decision as a means of supporting Finland and restraining Hitler's "partner" in the Kremlin while simultaneously denying passage of Swedish iron ore to Germany. (For even greater detail on this part of the story, see Patrick R. Osborn's Operation Pike.)
   At Raeder's behest, the Kriegsmarine carried out further studies. "In these deliberations the Luftwaffe was given a relatively limited role because the poor weather conditions of midwinter were [expected to be] unfavorable for conducting large-scale aerial operations."

   That the Luftwaffe would have an important role in any Norwegian campaign, however, was recognized early on in the planning process by the less partisan OKW. In the week following Hitler's meeting with Quisling, Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, head of the OKW's operations section, met with various Luftwaffe personnel regarding Norway. For instance, on 13 December, and within hours of Hitler's ordering the establishment of a small staff to look into an occupation of Norway, Jodl met with Hauptmann von Sternurg, a Luftwaffe staff officer, and on 18 December, he discussed the "Norwegian matter" with Hans Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe's chief of staff. Two days later, Jodl and Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, the OKW's chief of staff, discussed deploying elements of the X Fliegerkorps and the Luftwaffe's Strategic Air Reconnaissance Group "Rowehl" in reconnaissance over Norway. Indeed, OKW's Studie Nord had directed that a Luftwaffe general be appointed head of a special staff created to plan for the campaign and "who would be at the same time entrusted with the execution of any subsequent operation." Generaloberst Erhard Milch, the Air Ministry's state secretary and the Luftwaffe's armaments chief, was appointed to head this small staff, called Oyster (Auster), which assembled for the first time on the morning of 14 January 1940. This, however, was also its last meeting, because in late January Hitler recalled Studie Nord, dissolved Oyster, and placed all the planning for the campaign in the hands of the OKW.

   Claasen briefly reviews the transition of planning from the Kriegsmarine to the OKW staff. (For more details on this transition, see Geoffrey P. Megargee's Inside Hitler's High Command.) Within three weeks the original study had been expanded and transformed into an operational plan. On 16 February, the Altmark incident further increased Hitler's determination to strike in the north, determination also fueled by desperate pleas from Finland for British and French support, along with evidence of Allied planning for operations against Narvik. On 21 February Hitler appointed Nikolaus von Falkenhorst as overall commander of the invasion forces (although Hermann Goering's machinations later meant there was no true unified command). On 1 March Hitler issued his "Directive for Case Weserubung."
   The German invasion plans, as well as the Norwegian (and Danish) defenses, receive much attention. Up to this point, the book has not differed markedly from most of the previous works on Weserubung. Here, however, the author begins to investigate in considerable depth the nuts and bolts of Luftwaffe planning for the operation. In particular, Claasen discusses the composition and tasks of X Fliegerkorps and lays out the plans and the anticipated opposition by enemy aircraft and AA defenses—both reckoned to be negligible. He also covers the Luftwaffe's pre-invasion and aerial reconnaissance missions and sorties against Allied shipping at sea, against Scapa Flow, and against the Orkneys. This preliminary survey of plans in and of itself provides considerably more material on the Luftwaffe in Weserubung than other English-language books on the Norwegian campaign.
   Claasen then charts the opening moves and engagements of the Kriegsmarine and Royal Navy (and the final Luftwaffe sortie against Scapa Flow on the eve of the invasion) as the German naval forces begin approaching their targets in Norway.
   On 9 April 1940 the Wehrmacht rolled into Denmark, a nearly bloodless invasion which included the first combat parachute landing of the war. At the same time, the German assault against Norway commenced.
   About 35 pages are devoted to the first stage of the invasion, with heavy emphasis on Luftwaffe participation, including para drops, air landings, air strikes on Norwegian airfields, air attacks in support of naval landings, and air-sea operations. While not of the dogfight-by-dogfight school of history (see, for example, Fledgling Eagles by Christopher Shores), Hitler's Northern War nonetheless provides a fully rounded operational account of the Luftwaffe in the opening phases of the invasion, an account not matched elsewhere.
   Goering's forces were decisive in the initial operations in southern Norway. For all of their victories, however, the Luftwaffe forces were less effective at projecting aiprower across the longer ranges to central Norway, and they were unable to intervene farther north on behalf of the doomed German destroyers at Narvik. Destruction of the destroyers, along with the successful Allied counter-landing, left General Dietl's German troops in the north in an untenable position.

   While Hitler panicked, Milch set about the task of bringing Luflotte 5 up to full operational readiness. The Second Battle of Narvik and the inability of X Fliegerkorps to aid the destroyers rankled with Milch. At 1900 on 13 April, he rushed to Karinhall—Goering's opulent hunting estate north of Berlin—where, along with the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe and Jeschonnek, he drew up plans for extending the Luftwaffe's operational reach farther north. Burning the midnight oil, the three Luftwaffe leaders discussed the future tasks of Luftflotte 5. By the end of the meeting, Milch's notebook was full to overflowing with plans centered on reconnaissance around the Lofoten Islands, directives for attacks on enemy naval transports, and the reinforcement of Trondheim. German air transportation of troops to Oslo and Aalborg was to cease for a period so attention could be concentrated on Trondheim and Narvik.

   Although operating—to mix metaphors—on a shoestring at the end of a long tether, the Luftwaffe managed to gain air superiority in central Norway for support of ground operations as well as for making it increasingly risky for the Allies to conduct and sustain their own landings. The cruiser Suffolk was heavily damaged. The Allied-held port of Namsos was destroyed. So was Aandalsnes. British command and communication centers were flattened. When eighteen British Gladiators were dispatched to a makeshift base on a frozen lake near Aandalsnes, they survived for only 48 hours under Luftwaffe attacks. Under the circumstances, the Allies began to evacuate their forces from central Norway. The Luftwaffe bombed them every step of the way and struck the naval vessels as they arrived, loaded, and departed.
   Claasen quotes a bevy of authors who point to these operations as the first tangible proof of the ascendancy of airpower over seapower. He also quotes others who view the results as indicative that the Luftwaffe's impact on operations was mostly psychological and that the British simply failed to comprehend the demands of three-dimensional warfare. One historian even calls the Luftwaffe a "comparatively minor danger" to the Royal Navy during Weserubung.

   Yet the claim that the Luftwaffe constituted a "comparatively minor danger" rests on the fact that the British never attempted to test the thesis by carrying out their proposed incursion into Bergen or the direct assault on Trondheim [in the face of German airpower].
   Furthermore, whether or not the impact of German airpower in southern and central Norway was decisive in real terms misses the point. The fact is, large surface vessels were far more expensive and time-consuming to build, equip, and outfit than a good number of aircraft. In light of this, and because of its large overseas commitment, Britain was not prepared to put the matter of "sea power versus airpower" to the decisive test in a peripheral theater, when these vessels may very well have been needed elsewhere at a later date. Therefore, while the Luftwaffe was prepared to throw any amount of aircraft at the Royal Navy, the British acted on their real or imagined fears and relinquished supremacy in Norwegian waters to the Luftwaffe. In this sense, the Luftwaffe did play a decisive role during the campaign in severely curtailing Britannia's command of the waves. Its effectiveness against warships operating without sufficient air cover would be more than adequately demonstrated a year later at Crete, where the Royal Navy would suffer an even worse ordeal at the hands of German dive-bombers while endeavoring to evacuate Allied troops from the island. Nevertheless, Luftflotte 5's parting shots in May 1940 highlighted the overriding reason for German success in central Norway: air superiority. As undisputed ruler of the air, the Luftwaffe had reduced the Namsos and Aandalsnes bases to matchwood, harassed cold and weary Allied troops at will, threatened to completely shut down the sea approaches, and regularly cut the lines of communication to forward units. In short, the Luftwaffe had made the whole British operation untenable.

   Claasen completes this part of the book with the role of the Luftwaffe over northern Norway and Narvik in particular, including duels with RAF aircraft based at Bardufoss (which he refers to as Bardufloss). These operations demonstrated the limitations of German airpower, in particular because of the short-ranged nature of most Luftwaffe aircraft, although such limitations were not readily evident to everyone at the time. Even in the post-war years, as the book goes on to explain, historians have tended to give the Luftwaffe too much credit for the eventual victory at Narvik.
   The background material, planning for Weserubung, and the account of operations in Denmark and Norway through the final Allied evacuation comprise 140 pages. From that point, Claasen moves into the role of the Norwegian-based Luftwaffe units in the larger war effort. While "grandiose plans were being formulated for [a huge naval base and German metropolis at] Trondheim" according to the confluence of Wegener's strategy and Nazi racial goals, the practical value of Hitler's new northern domain proved less than originally envisioned.
   Given the paucity of air and naval resources available in the northern theater, options remained quite limited. This limitation was further exacerbated by typical Wehrmacht in-fighting over control of Luftwaffe units for naval reconnaissance and anti-shipping operations. Tactical air-naval cooperation also left a great deal to be desired. Claasen further shows how Germany's failure to develop a suitable long-range bomber also seriously hampered efforts to take advantage of newly won bases in Norway.
   Insufficient range of the Luftwaffe's fighters and bombers also contributed to Norwegian-based Luftflotte 5's failure to play a useful role in the Battle of Britain. After a dismal initial performance on 15 August 1940 when a strike was launched from Sola and twenty aircraft were lost, Luftflotte 5's forces were quickly siphoned off to reinforce the main front, Luftwaffe strength in Norway plummeted, and no further missions were launched against the British Isles from Norwegian bases during the Battle of Britain.

   If, during this period, the Germans had had a four-engined bomber capable of flying from Scandinavian airfields at Sola and Aalborg as well as France, Holland, and Denmark, it might well have tipped the scales in the Luftwaffe's favor. Accordingly, when attempting to explain the failure of the Luftwaffe to gain mastery over the RAF, historians and military commentators often cite the lack of true four-engined bombers as a significant factor. This view was also held by many of the participants who, with the benefit of hindsight, agreed with Kesselring's postwar lamentation regarding the Battle of Britain: "We needed four-engined bombers with great range of action, climbing power, speed, load capacity and armament." With regard to Kesselring's observation, and bearing in mind the RAF's aircraft and personnel crisis in the period 24 August to 6 September, it is possible to enumerate three reasons that significant numbers of four-engined bombers would have enabled the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority over the RAF. First, due to their long range, the planes would have stretched the defensive resources of the RAF to the breaking point. Second, the much greater weight of bombs dropped might have struck a decisive blow against Britain's air defense system. Third, the high altitude attainable by a four-engined bomber would have placed the defending fighters at an extreme disadvantage.

   Interesting though this speculation might be, there's no mention of what trade-offs the Luftwaffe would have been required to make in order to produce such a four-engined bomber fleet, and no mention of what such trade-offs would have meant to other operations. The big bombers would not have appeared out of thin air, so other production would almost certainly have been reduced. Would there have been fewer fighters to gain air superiority in the first place? Fewer Stukas for ground support? Fewer Ju 52 transports for air landings?
   Claasen also speculates that concentrating the Luftwaffe against British ports and shipping—especially with support of long-range bombers from Norway—might have been, by cutting off vital imports, the best way to employ German forces in the effort to bring the UK to its knees in the vulnerable period after Dunkirk. To this end he offers considerable discussion of mining and anti-shipping operations conducted from Norway.
   The author then discusses the switch of the four-engine Condors—the only Luftwaffe aircraft remotely suited to the task—to Kriegsmarine control, the establishment of coastal "Fliegerfuehrer" headquarters for air-naval cooperation, and the coordination of aircraft and U-boats in hunting down and destroying Allied shipping.
   The concluding 80 pages of Hitler's Northern War focus on Luftwaffe operations versus the Arctic convoys and on the gradual deterioration of German air strength in Norway. Those pages also briefly cover Luftwaffe participation from Norwegian bases in the war against the Soviet Union.

   As with the war against Britain in 1940, Luftflotte 5 found itself at the periphery of the main event at hand. By the time the invasion of the Soviet Union was about to begin, the air fleet had been reorganized, with Luftgau Norwegen's headquarters situated at Oslo; Fliegerfuehrer Stavanger covering the central and northern parts of the country; Jagdfliegerfuehrer Norwegen controlling the air fleet's fighter units; and Fliegerfuehrer Kirkenes established at the very top of the country with airfields at Kirkenes and Banak. Of Luftflotte 5's 180 aircraft, 60 would be dedicated to operations on the Karelian front, which was anticipated to extend up to 350 kilometers in length and nearly 900 kilometers in depth from Fliegerfuehrer Kirkenes's main base of operations at Banak to the farthest target, Archangel. Under the command of Oberst Andreas Nielsen, Fliegerfuehrer Kirkenes was by far the weakest force involved in Barbarossa, constituting only 10 Ju 88 bombers of KG 30, 30 dive-bombers, 10 JG 77 Bf 109 fighters, a schwarm (five aircraft) of ZG 76 Bf 110s, 10 reconnaissance planes, and an antiaircraft artillery battalion. In comparison, Luftflotten 1, 2, and 4 numbered 430, 910, and 600 aircraft, respectively. In addition to raiding the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, Germany's northern-most air fleet was charged with attacking Soviet shipping, providing close air support for the army, interdicting troop movements on the Murmansk railroad, bringing about the destruction of Soviet air facilities, and destroying the lock controlling the Baltic-White Sea Canal.

   But the Russian Front proved too large, too distant, and too resilient for the puny forces in Norway to have any decisive impact. Instead, the focus of attention quickly shifted to an escalating game of second-guessing as Churchill—with his fixation on an Allied invasion of Norway—and Hitler—with his own fixation on repelling an Allied invasion—hatched plans involving the far north. The Allies launched commando raids. The Germans dispatched reinforcements.
   Although the German reinforcements were originally defensive in nature, their proximity to the Arctic convoy route, plus the growing size and importance of those convoys, inevitably meant that efforts were made to halt or reduce shipments to the Soviets. In conjunction with the Kriegsmarine's warships and U-boats in northern waters, the Luftwaffe began striking the merchant vessels and their naval escorts.
   Claasen charts the growing German strength, the increasingly effective air-naval cooperation, and even such issues as air-sea rescue services in the attacks on PQ13, PQ14, PQ15, and PQ16. Of course, his main emphasis falls on the destruction of PQ17. From the high point of German success against that convoy, the saga continues with the successful but costly attack against PQ18.

   At the conclusion of the operation, the Luftwaffe, in over 330 sorties, had contributed to the sinking of thirteen ships, of which ten were direct victims of air action. The cost had been extremely high. During the entire operation against PQ 18, Luftflotte 5 lost forty-four aircraft, of which thirty-eight were torpedo bombers. As the RAF's postwar analysis of the operation concluded, the British escorts had proved more than a match for the Luftwaffe: "It was found that not only was it impossible to approach the carrier to launch an effective attack—on account of fighters—but that a wide screen of warships made the launching of torpedoes against the inner merchant vessels an extremely hazardous undertaking." Nevertheless, despite these losses, the experiences of KG 26 in Norway had confirmed the effectiveness of aerial torpedoes in maritime warfare. Ten of the thirteen ships destroyed were the victims of torpedoes delivered by KG 26. Of the 860 sorties flown by Stumpff's aircraft against PQs 16, 17, and 18, over 340 were made by torpedo bombers. German assessments of these operations confirmed that the torpedo bomber was the most efficient means of knocking out enemy merchantmen. The Luftwaffe's 8th Abteilung calculated that while only one vessel was sunk for every 19 bombing sorties undertaken, torpedo missions sank an Allied vessel every 8 sorties; that is, they were on average twice as effective as high-level or dive-bombing attacks, and one-quarter of all the torpedoes launched struck home.

   But from that point German forces diminished and German fortunes ebbed. The final chapter of the book chronicles the loss of Scharnhorst and Tirpitz, the rising tide of Allied airpower, and the reduction of the Luftwaffe in Norway to a passive defensive force and meteorological mission. The Arctic convoys, much better defended, continued to be tantalizing targets, but the Luftwaffe was neither strong enough nor sufficiently well-equipped to be more than a nuisance. By the end of the war, Claasen notes, the Luftwaffe in Norway had proportionally large stocks of aviation fuel in comparison to German air force units at home, but its northern aircraft had been rendered impotent.

   Yet the Luftwaffe was to suffer one final indignity before all was over. On the first day of May, after a couple of failed previous attempts, the Home Fleet sailed from Scapa toward the Norwegian coast to attack the Arctic U-boat flotilla supply ship and any other vessels present in Vest Fjord. The operation by a force made up of two cruisers, three escort carriers, and seven destroyers was a great success: the carriers' Avengers and Wildcats laid waste the German base facilities, sunk the supply ship and a small merchantman, and destroyed a U-boat. It was the last major sweep by the Home Fleet in the war and showed just how far the Luftwaffe had fallen. In 1940, the Royal Navy had been so knocked about by the Luftwaffe that it dared not venture into the waters off Norway for the next two years. Times had certainly changed. In May 1945, the Royal Navy and its aircraft demonstrated once and for all that Britannia had reclaimed the waves off Norway from the Luftwaffe.

   In his conclusion, Claasen reviews the course of the war in Norway, embellishes some of his earlier conclusions, and pays special attention to the abilities and personalities of the German leaders involved in the northern theater. Not surprisingly, Hitler and Goering come in for much criticism. On the other hand, Milch and Stumpff—successive commanders of Luftwaffe forces in Norway—receive a great deal of credit for their efforts. The author's recapitulation of the ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the Arctic convoys and the Luftwaffe's inability to patrol and defend Norway's lengthy coastline against Allied bombing raids make it clear that the grand strategic vision for Hitler's northern theater was never realized. Claasen's earlier remarks about the Luftwaffe's lack of four-engine bombers continues to ring true.

   That the Germans had entered the war without a long-range aircraft suitable for maritime work was the single most important factor in preventing the Luftwaffe from making use of Norway as originally planned. Certainly, had either the navy or the Luftwaffe been equipped with such aircraft in sufficient numbers, Norway would have served as a genuine northern arm of a deadly embrace of the British Isles. Through a combination of U-boats and long-range reconnaissance, antishipping Piratenflugzeuge, Germany might well have forced a British capitulation in 1942. As it was, neither the Navy nor the Luftwaffe had sufficient numbers suitable for maritime operations, and once the war spread from northern and western Europe to the Mediterranean and then the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe was increasingly unable to devote even its medium-range twin-engined bombers to the likes of Fliegerfuehrer Atlantic, let alone Fliegerfuehrer Nord in Norway. Although it is true that the war came earlier than anticipated, and thus stymied the grand rearmament plans of both services, it is clear that aircraft for maritime deployment was never high on the Reich's shopping list. Whether a 200-strong force of four-engined aircraft suitable for naval warfare was under the direct control of the navy or the Luftwaffe is somewhat irrelevant; what is significant is that no such force was ever created.

   Claasen sums up Germany's Norwegian theater nicely in his concluding paragraph:

   ...Hitler's determination to retain Norway did not wane, even in the twilight of the war. Although the approximately 300,000 troops stationed there in the latter months of the war would have been far better deployed on German soil in defense of the Reich, he was not prepared to give up his Nordic base, reasoning, as the Red Army bore down on Berlin, that it should be retained not only to prevent Sweden from entering the war on the Allied side but also because of its importance as an invaluable source for fish [for feeding the German people]. In general, though, Norway failed to live up to its billing as a base for aerial operations against Britain almost as soon as the Germans secured the country. In April 1942 Hitler declared that the invasion of Norway had been one of the two most decisive events so far in the entire war—the other being the defensive battle outside Moscow during December 1941—because control of the Norwegian coastline enabled his forces to launch attacks on northern Britain and Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union, but in reality the results were far from spectacular. Despite Luftflotte 5's brief period of glory against PQ 17, Norway very quickly reverted to a strategic backwater, the retention of which reflected more the Fuehrer's obsession than pressing military reality. In the end, where the Luftwaffe and navy were concerned, not only were the strategic opportunities offered by the Norwegian invasion never realized, but later, as tactical efficiency was beset by shrinking forces, bitter interservice feuding, and high command interferences, they never received the priority they deserved in what was one of the Second World War's most demanding theaters.

   This is a solid, workmanlike product. Unfortunately, it lacks the kind of extra zest conferred on Hayward's Stopped at Stalingrad by the inclusion of entries from the juicy diary of Wolfram von Richthofen. Moreover, it could have been improved by more attention to precisely identifying Luftwaffe (and enemy) OBs, bases and facilities, units, and the aircraft of those units. Nonetheless, Hitler's Northern War stands as the best work on the subject in English. Recommended, and a book to keep in mind for this year's Top Ten balloting.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.