ISBN 0-300-10780-3
xxii + 310 pages

Acknowledgments; Sources; Introduction; Abbreviations and Acronyms; Conclusion; Glossary of Spies and Their Masters; Notes; Index

Appendices: Organization and Functions of Soviet Military Intelligence; Hitler's Letters to Stalin; Those Executed without Trial on October 28, 1941; Chronology of Agent Reporting

   Before plunging into the book, some points can be made without fear of contradiction. First, no one can say with absolute certainty exactly what Stalin knew about the likelihood of a German attack. Furthermore, no one can say with absolute certainty what Stalin believed and why he acted as he did. Some reputable historians insist that Stalin intended to attack Germany before Hitler could launch Barbarossa. Some less credible theories claim that Stalin was fully aware of the impending invasion, but he intentionally allowed Hitler to strike the first blow in order to trap and destroy the Wehrmacht under a plan devised by Zhukov. Others theorize that Stalin was simply fooled by a clever German strategy of disinformation.
   Despite the inability of anyone to pin down every relevant fact and peer into Stalin's mind, David E. Murphy makes a valiant effort to bring together all the intelligence gathered about German intentions, understand how the information was handled, and comprehend how Stalin (and others) reacted to the material. His introductory notes, however, make clear his dissatisfaction that he has been unable to provide fuller information and better documentation. A large proportion of the archives concerned with this topic have never been opened, and some previously declassified documents are now off limits again. Thus, some of Murphy's work remains incomplete and ambiguous despite his best efforts to piece together as much as possible. Even with that limitation, after measuring all the evidence Murphy places himself in the ranks of those who lay blame squarely on Stalin's shoulders for the disaster that befell the Soviet Union, because—in his view—the German deception plan, including personal messages from Hitler, outsmarted the Soviet leader. The author relies on more than just guesswork, and the constant flow of detailed intelligence charted here makes a compelling case.
   The author surveys a vast intelligence collection service at work for the Soviets in a series of more than twenty chapters, most weighing in at no more than ten pages. One impression that soon emerges from the book is the sheer volume of data being forwarded to Moscow from a multitude of sources. It seems little remained unknown to the Soviets, particularly in the area of German preparations for Barbarossa. Appendix 4, "Chronology of Agent Reporting," summarizes in eye-opening fashion the key reports on the German invasion, dating from an August 1940 message from Paris ("The Germans have turned down an offensive against England. Preparations, apparently continuing for such an eventuality, are merely intended to hide the movement of German forces to the east where there are already 106 divisions") through multiple reports dated June 19, 20, and 21 from Berlin, Helsinki, Sofia, Paris, a source in the German embassy in Moscow, and a German deserter—all pointing to 22 June as the date for Barbarossa.
   Murphy reviews the structure of Soviet intelligence, introduces all the major players, and describes the sources including Germans working against Hitler, agents with access to loose-lipped foreign military and political figures, and dirty work such as bugging the quarters of the German military attache in Moscow.
   At the same time all these reports were being received from more or less reliable sources, German intelligence conducted a carefully orchestrated stream of disinformation and deception. Thus, no matter how accurate some reports seemed, the Soviets constantly struggled to determine which information could be trusted. This proved particularly difficult in an environment where many Red Army officers and Soviet officials were arrested and tortured into confessing crimes against the state and implicating others in their nefarious imaginary schemes.
   For example, here's part of the chapter about Richard Sorge, one of the best sources of intelligence but never entirely trusted:

   As late as August 11, 1941, when the war Sorge had predicted was overwhelming the Red Army and Sorge's network was straining to respond to Moscow's orders to determine whether Japan would attack the Soviet Far East, a memorandum was prepared at the RU headquarters casting doubt on Sorge s loyalty. It used testimony incriminating Sorge from officers who during the purges had admitted that they were German and Japanese spies; supposedly, they had named Sorge to their German and Japanese interrogators as a Soviet intelligence officer. The memorandum argued that Sorge must be under hostile control as the enemy already knew the truth about him. Each of the three officers named was later rehabilitated. This negative attitude toward Sorge had other consequences. In February 1941, when Soviet military intelligence in Moscow should have been concerned with what Sorge could produce, Golikov informed him that "I consider it necessary to reduce expenses in your office to 2,000 yen per month." On March 26, 1941, Sorge replied: "When we received your orders to cut our expenses in half, we took it as a kind of punishment. You have probably received our detailed telegram in which we tried to show you that cutting [funds] in half... is tantamount to destroying our apparatus." Contrast this behavior with that of Golikov s immediate predecessor, Proskurov, when he had to refuse Sorge's request to return to Moscow in June 1939. Proskurov sent this note to the Japanese section of the RU handling the Sorge case: "Think carefully about how we could compensate for Ramsay's [Sorge's] recall. Prepare a telegram and letter to Ramsay with excuses for the delay in replacing him and listing the reasons it is necessary for him to remain in Tokyo. Give Ramsay and the other members of his organization a onetime monetary bonus."
   For his part, as late as the early 1960s Golikov apparently still believed Sorge had been under hostile control. In the middle of a screening of the Franco-German film Wer Sind Sie, Dr. Sorge? to senior officers, Marshal Zhukov, angry at not having been shown the Sorge reports predicting the war and its exact date, stood up in the theater and called out to Golikov: "Why, Filipp Ivanovich, did you hide these reports from me? Not report such information to the chief of the general staff?" Golikov replied, "And what should I have reported to you if this Sorge was a double, ours and theirs?"

   Murphy does a convincing job of explaining how this ongoing uncertainly caused endless pressure in the Soviet offices charged with verifying the data, packaging it, and forwarding it to what would now be called "consumers." In Moscow, that term would have mostly referred to Stalin, and he was a very fussy consumer indeed. Throughout the book, Stalin appears to have been constantly sceptical of almost every piece of intelligence presented to him. According to Murphy, on those few occasions when someone dared to press him about some particular evidence, Stalin would simply indicate that he possessed other reports. (See below.)
   When the all-powerful leader, particularly one of such murderous bent, deemed as "provocation" any intelligence lending credence to an enemy invasion, those handling the reports needed to decide how to proceed without finding themselves in front of a firing squad. For three of the principals in his book, Murphy provides some insights. Pavel Fitin, head of NKVD/NKGB foreign intelligence, "...did his job as well as or even better than expected and insisted on sending reports to Stalin that consistently predicted a German invasion. When rebuffed, he kept quiet." Fitin, unlike many of his contemporaries, was not executed but was demoted and eventually labeled "unsuitable for service." Filipp Golikov, chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, in the same situation "simply suppressed or altered analyses of the German threat to fit Stalin's mistaken ideas." Golikov was rewarded with promotions and, despite proven incompetence on the battlefield, assumed a series of important field commands during the war. (Golikov also stated in 1965: "I admit I distorted intelligence to please Stalin because I feared him.") Finally, Ivan Proskurov, previous head of Military Intelligence, outspoken in his views, unwilling to be silenced, and adamant that his reports on German intentions could not possibly be explained away as disinformation, was on Stalin's orders executed without trial.
   And what about Stalin himself? Murphy places the blame squarely on the Boss. In the author's view, Stalin was wrong on many counts. In the first place, he did not understand the subtle political realities of the western nations, and he always suspected the US and the UK of urging Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. By avoiding any confrontation with Germany, Stalin expected the capitalist nations to bludgeon themselves into bloody corpses. Even with the rapid, unanticipated fall of France, it seemed that he could buy time by ignoring provocations (such as the extensive campaign of Luftwaffe recon incursions). Furthermore, Stalin seems to have been truly fooled by the German disinformation campaign, including personal letters from Hitler (two of which are quoted in an appendix, but there is some doubt regarding their authenticity, and Murphy devotes a chapter to a tangled tale verging from fact to fiction and back). Hitler steadfastly pretended that German forces massing on the Soviet borders were simply there to keep them "away from the eyes of the English" during preparations for an invasion of Britain, assured Stalin "on my honor as a chief of state" that rumors of an attack on the Soviet Union were completely untrue, and simultaneously asked forbearance in the event of any incident precipitated by renegade German generals "who might have forgotten their duty."
   That last bit of deception (assuming the Hitler letters are authentic) concerning the possibility of unauthorized attacks by renegade generals seems preposterous at this distance, but it could explain orders issued to Soviet forces on 22 June to smash the invaders but not violate enemy territory.

   Defenders of Stalin's role have blamed the extensive, comprehensive German deception or disinformation program for his refusal to accept intelligence from his own services that reflected German intentions to invade and for his insistence that no actions be undertaken by his military professionals that might provoke the Germans to attack. There can be no doubt that the German deception effort, led by Hitler himself, was highly effective. Not only did it mislead Soviet intelligence and diplomacy, but Hitler appears to have personally reassured Stalin that Great Britain, not the Soviet Union, was Germany's principal enemy While Stalin shared some of these assurances with his top military leaders, he apparently never revealed precise details or the extent to which he believed, and indeed acted on, them in matters vital to his country's defense. How to explain his incredible toleration of the yearlong Luftwaffe reconnaissance program that doomed his air forces to destruction on June 22, 1941, and left his unprotected troops open to murderous strafing? Or his naive belief that the attacks that came at dawn that morning were the work of recalcitrant Wehrmacht generals acting against Hitler's wishes? Had Stalin discussed these questions frankly with his top military leaders, they might have been able to disabuse him of some of his convictions. But this was not Stalin's style. He was convinced that he possessed the only correct information on German intentions, and he kept it to himself, saying only to his top leaders: "I have other reports."
   Leaving aside Stalin's poor judgment or naivete in trusting Hitler, an important reason for the success of German deception lay in the system Stalin had created. The weight of evidence furnished by the Soviet Intelligence and security services and confirmed by the observations of agents in the railroads and of the border troops was overwhelming. In fact, the only rational explanation for this information‹the massing of bridging equipment, the equipping of locomotives with devices enabling them to adapt to the Russian railroad track gauge, the instructions to Abwehr agents to collect samples of Soviet fuel and lubricants‹was the prospect of an imminent German invasion. If Stalin did not accept this information, however, it simply could not be acted on. He alone was the final arbiter of what constituted valid intelligence. Few professional officers would risk confronting Stalin. The memory of the terror of the 1930s was too recent and the military leadership at the very top was too aware of the new wave of arrests taking place during April, May and June 1941.

   What Stalin Knew does a good job of examining the evidence about what reports went to Stalin, where they came from, and how the intelligence was managed. Some parts of the book prove a little sketchy and ambiguous, but that's to be expected in a work on a subject as murky as this one, especially with such limited access to relevant archives. Although Murphy occasionally strays from his main topic (such as a chapter mostly devoted to training accidents among inexperienced Soviet aircrews), those kinds of excursions help provide a chilling view of the inner workings of the Kremlin and how Stalin was perfectly capable of simply executing anyone who disagreed with him or knew about his mistakes. The author's catalog of intelligence reports makes a compelling case that Stalin could not possibly have been unaware of the coming invasion, and Murphy goes on to draw logical conclusions about why Stalin chose to disbelieve the facts.
   Finally, whatever one's political leanings in the early years of the 21st century, the entire issue of intelligence, disinformation, and tailoring product to suit consumer is one that remains as contentious in the current world as in the years leading up to Operation Barbarossa, adding that much more importance to Murphy's impressive book.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Yale University Press.
   Thanks to Yale for providing this review copy.