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ISBN 978-0-7603-3049-4
128 pages

Photographs; maps; tables; sidebars; Index

   Tiger tanks continue to possess a mystique unmatched by any other AFV of the Second World War, and books about them abound. Now the prolific George Forty, having already tackled a wide variety of topics, has written his own account of the Tigers. Unlike most books about the heavy panzers, however, this one focuses not on the hardware but rather on the battalions into which the tanks were organized, thus emphasizing unit histories and combat operations rather than design, production, and technical minutiae.
   In theory, this should be a perfect subject for Forty. As a retired officer of the Royal Tank Regiment and curator of the Bovington Tank Museum, he's well-positioned to put together a definitive history of the Tigers. Unfortunately, Tiger Tank Battalions ends up being a brief, generic, derivative effort. It's neither the first nor the best on the subject.
   Unlike more scholarly researchers, the author offers no footnotes and cites no sources for his facts. Right off the bat, he indicates that Tigers were initially used in combat during an attack in the Leningrad sector on 30 August 1942. It's entirely possible that date is accurate, but the precise chronology of actions by elements of the 502nd Panzer Battalion remains murky, and most sources place the attack in the second half of September. Forty offers no citation for his date. A couple of paragraphs later, this information appears: "...between January 12th and March 31st, 1943, the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion, now complete, destroyed some 160 Soviet tanks for the loss of just six Tigers." Not an outlandish assertion, but another statement of fact with no citation.
   So, what are his sources? While Forty provides neither footnotes nor a complete list of references, at the end of the book he does offer a short "Critical Bibliography" of about twelve books. Among them are works by Thomas Jentz and Christopher Wilbeck, books accounting for a large proportion of the English-language literature on the organization and operations of Tiger battalions, as opposed to books about engines, transmissions, armor thickness, and rubber-cushioned roadwheels. In particular, anyone familiar with Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II by Wilbeck (published in 2004) and Germany's Tiger Tanks, volume 3: Tiger I & II: Combat Tactics by Jentz (published in 1997) will immediately notice how Forty's book contains many similarities in structure and content.
   For example, Sledgehammers quotes the same figures of approximately 160 Soviet tanks destroyed for the loss of six Tigers. Where Forty offers no source at all, Wilbeck cites Germany's Tiger Tanks by Jentz, and Jentz in turn quotes a German 18th Army document. Also of note, Forty utilizes an extract from Heinz Guderian's Panzer Leader to explain the premature commitment of Tigers, a quote also used by Wilbeck.
   Within the first few pages, therefore, Forty appears to establish his book as a fairly imitative work assembled in large measure from uncited secondary sources such as Jentz and Wilbeck. That pattern endures throughout the remaining chapters.
   The second chapter, "Ready for War," circles back to discuss the formation and organization of the tank companies and battalions equipped with Tigers. While the chapter covers little new ground, it contains several illustrative charts and tables, an approach used throughout the book which proves to be one of its strengths. Even so, Forty condenses into about ten pages—including ample photographs—the same material Wilbeck deals with in more detail in about 25 pages, also with tables of organization but sans photos. Jentz also covers that ground and includes some additional detail, including tables showing the number of Tigers sent to the front on a month-by-month and unit-by-unit basis.
   "In Action" emerges as the longest chapter by far, at almost 50 pages, in Forty's book. This takes each front in turn (Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, Russian Front, Northwest Europe) and describes the operational employment of each Tiger-equipped unit in that theater. For the campaign in Tunisia, for example, Forty presents about five pages of text. Here's an example of what he writes:

   Later the battalion would take part in a major German attack, Operation Eilboete, which began on January 18th. General von Arnim's plan was to capture all five of the passes through the Eastern Dorsales range, in order to give Axis forces a series of launching pads from which they could strike into the Tunisian plain beyond. The Tigers of the 501st played their part as members of a battle group deployed in the area south-west of Pont-du-Fahs and Zaghouan. They were hampered considerably by well placed Allied minefields, covered by a screen of 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and also by the serious lack of replacement Tiger roadwheels and other spares. During the action, anti-tank guns belonging to 72nd Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery, knocked out two Tigers, proving that they were not invulnerable. The Allies managed to hold on to the vital Kasserine Pass and the Axis attack ran out of steam. This action would be followed later by two more major operations: Fruhlingswind and Ochsenkopf and many minor ones. The first of the two resulted in nearly seventy U.S. tanks being destroyed, of which many were knocked out by 1st Company of the 501st. A few days later, the company was ordered to deal with a concentration of U.S. armor north-west of Sidi-bou-Zid. It did so, again knocking out a large number of American tanks and wheeled vehicles. Operation Ochsenkopf's aim had been to capture Medjez-el-Bab. However, not only did it not succeed, it also led to numerous unwelcome Tiger casualties from a well-laid British anti-tank gun ambush at a defile known as Hunt's Gap.

   It should come as no surprise that both Wilbeck and Jentz discuss exactly the same operations by the same units on the same fronts.
   Here's an excerpt from what Wilbeck writes in his thirteen pages on operations in Tunisia:

   Combat Groups Gerhardt and Reimann broke through the Faid Pass by 0600 on 14 February 1943, destroying Company G of the American 1st Armored Regiment in the process. After traveling generally along the main road to Sbeitla, Combat Group Gerhardt moved to the north and encircled the high ground near Djebel Lessouda, on which the Americans had constructed a strongpoint. At the same time, Combat Group Reimann, led by Tigers, attacked along the main road.
   Uncertain of the situation, Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division sent two companies from the 1st Armored Regiment and a company from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion "to clear up the situation." This force traveled up the road from Sidi Bou Zid to the road junction called Poste Lessouda. At some point they were warned by American forces on the Djebel Lessouda that the Germans were in the vicinity of Poste Lessouda. A few minutes later, they came within sight and range of the enemy and began to take losses from what was believed to be 88mm guns, perhaps from Tiger tanks.
   Combat Group Reimann, supported by six Tigers of the 1st Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 501, forced the American tanks and tank destroyers to withdraw. Later in the day, only one of the American companies was available to conduct another "counterattack by fire and maneuver" to delay the Germans. This counterattack was also turned back with the assistance of the Tigers. According to the American official history, "American losses were heavy, and, in the last hour of the morning, the unequal contest ended in a withdrawal southwestward." The remainder of the day was spent completing the encirclement of American forces on their mountaintop strongpoints, to be followed by their eventual reduction and elimination.
   The accomplishments of the handful of Tigers operating with Combat Group Reimann—in the space of about six hours, just prior to daybreak until around noon—was remarkable. They assisted in breaking through their opponents' forward defenses, destroying a tank company in the process. They continued the attack and assisted in defeating two counterattacks, destroying a total of 20 Shermans throughout the day.

   Jentz also provides much information on operations in Tunisia (about 20 pages), including arrival dates for each Tiger, with the first unloaded at Bizerte on 23 November 1942. Most of his material comes directly from wartime German documents, but here's part of what he writes:

   In the interim, the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 had been formed, issued 25 Pz.Kpfw.III (5 cm Kw.K. L/60) plus two Befehls-Tigers in January and 18 Tigers in February 1943. The unit was ordered to prepare for tropical employment on 17 February 1943 and assigned as the III.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 8 of the 15.Panzer-Division on 26 February 1943. Ordered to be transferred to Tunisia, the Tigers were once again shipped one per motor lighter. The first three Tigers landed in Tunis on 12 March, the next five in Bizerte on 22/23 March, two more in Tunis on 1 April, and the last one of the eleven Tigers in Bizerte on 16 April. Only the Stab, Stabskompanie, and 1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 with 11 Tigers and 19 Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.M were shipped to Tunisia. The 2.Kompanie remained behind in Sicily with nine Tigers and six Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.M.
   Two replacement Tigers had been issued to the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 in February 1943. These were transported to Italy and subsequently Sicily but were not shipped over to Tunisia. Eventually these two Tigers were assigned to the 2.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 on Sicily.
   The number of operational Tigers available for action in Tunisia was reported as 6 on 10 March, 7 on 15 March, 9 on 19 March, 9 on 24 March, 8 on 30 March, 17 on 4 April, 13 on 5 April, 6 on 13 April, 8 on 15 April, 10 on 18 April, 4 on 1 May, 4 on 3 May, and 1 in the last report on 4 May.
   On 13 April 1943, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 reported that it still had eight Tigers (tactical numbers 01, 02, 712, 721, 722, 724, 731, 732) and seven Pz.Kpfw.III(75) (tactical numbers 713, 715, 723, 725, 733, 734) plus one Tiger (tactical number 111) and four Pz.Kpfw.III(5lg) (tactical numbers 01, 05, 113, 114) attached from the 1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504. In the interim, all of the Tigers and Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.N from the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 had been renumbered and consolidated into the 1.Kompanie.
   On 18 April 1943, the 1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 was attached to Kampfgruppe Ickens along with elements of Panzer-Regiment 5 and Panzer-Regiment 8. On 19 April, the 1.Kompanie/schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501 reported their operational strength as five Tigers (tactical numbers 111, 712, 724, 731, 732), six Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.N (tactical numbers 713, 723, 725, 733, 734, 735), and three Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.M (tactical numbers 01, 113, 114).

   For the most part, Jentz relies on original German documents which he quotes extensively whereas Wilbeck pieces together his own accounts based on a variety of sources and gives much more emphasis to analyzing the action in order to compare and contrast the performance of Tiger battalions in different sets of circumstances. Forty tends to compose more generally, and the bulk of his content consists of brief sketches of unit histories with little detail, little documentation, and little critical analysis.
   Following his long chapter about unit histories, Forty moves on to four more much shorter chapters. The first, "Equipment & Insignia," talks about the German cross painted on panzers, turret numbering (a three-digit sequence identifying company, platoon, and vehicle), unit insignia (with examples in color), vehicle camouflage, and uniforms. The same chapter goes on to discuss assorted German vehicles including the Panzer III, Tiger variants, "tracked demolition charge layers," recovery vehicles, flakpanzers, halftracks, motorcycles, and others related to Tiger-equipped battalions.
   The fifth chapter, "Personalities," provides thumbnail biographies of Franz Bake, Helmut Hudel, Otto Carius, and Michael Wittmann, among the most famous of all Tiger men. The same chapter includes a table listing all the commanding officers, with service dates, of each Tiger battalion. Another table lists everyone who was awarded the Knight's Cross while serving with a heavy tank battalion, and yet another table shows the top-scoring Tiger "aces" in terms of enemy tanks destroyed, led by Knispel with 162, Carius with 150, Bolter with 144, and Wittmann with 121 (or possibly 138).
   The chapter on "Assessment" seems to stray a bit, mostly covering "Tiger tamers": Allied weapons that posed the biggest threat to Tigers, including the M26 Pershing, the M36 tank destroyer, the Sherman Firefly, the M10 Achilles tank destroyer, and the Soviet IS-2 and IS-3 heavy tanks. Forty also lists "strengths and weaknesses" of the Tiger I. However, with items like "plenty of space for the loader to deal with the long, heavy round" and "gunner must exit via commander's cupola," these assessments are very much more related to the tank itself, and not to the employment of Tiger-equipped battalions. In that sense, neither Forty's table nor much else in his "Assessment" chapter really compares to Wilbeck's evaluation of heavy tank battalions in action.
   The final chapter, "Reference," is quite a mixed bag, beginning with sections providing all the locations where surviving Tigers can be seen on display, such as the tank museums at Bovington and Aberdeen. (We're proud to say we've seen them at both places.) Next the author recommends five websites devoted to Tigers. A "Critical Bibliography" follows in which Forty offers very brief remarks about roughly a dozen books about panzers in general and Tigers in particular. Finally, he mentions a CD and a DVD to round out his recommendations.
   Interestingly, in a boo-boo not often seen in the industry, the publisher found it necessary to completely replace the one-page index at the end of the book with an errata index pasted over the original page.
   Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II is a perfectly acceptable, colorful, visually attractive, lightweight, abbreviated introduction to the subject, but it can't really compare to the depth and rigor of scholarship found in Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II by Wilbeck or Germany's Tiger Tanks, volume 3: Tiger I & II: Combat Tactics by Jentz. Forty's book might serve as a satisfactory primer, but Wilbeck and Jentz offer much more.
   The author's "Reference" chapter says of Jentz, "...much admired on both sides of the Atlantic," and of Wilbeck, "I bow to the excellence of his work." That pretty much sums it up.
   Thanks to Zenith Press for providing this review copy.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Zenith.

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Reviewed 15 February 2009
Copyright © 2009 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone