Book reviews 
 Recommended reading 
 Book forum 
 Latest book feedback 

 Popular resources 
 Recent views 
 Random book 

 Newsletter requests 
 Sell your books 

 War Diary 
 Armies 
 Nations at war 
 History 
 Trivia challenge 

 WWII links

 About us 
 Site guide 
 Site index 

Bishop, Patrick. Battle of Britain: A Day-by-Day Chronicle, 10 July 1940 to 1 October 1940. London: Quercus Publishing, 2009

ISBN 978-1-84724-984-5
392 pages

Introduction; photos; maps; OBs; tables; Sources; Index; Acknowledgements

Appendices: Aircraft of the Battle of Britain

   Finally! At long last a book about this obscure and under-researched topic!
   Just kidding.
   But this really is, no kidding, the best book about the Battle of Britain to come down the runway in quite awhile. No, it reveals nothing shocking or unexpected. No, readers don't need to rush out and acquire a copy at any cost. No, it won't be the last book about the campaign. Yes, however, yes, it deserves some attention.
   After the Introduction and first chapter (covering outbreak of the war, Sitzkrieg, the fall of France, and Dunkirk), the book divides into five chapters, each in turn split into daily entries. Each entry runs anywhere from a few sentences to a few paragraphs to a few pages, depending on the intensity of action and other events. Most entries encompass a brief assessment of weather conditions, notes about wider strategic issues, plans for the day's operations, fairly detailed accounts of raids and combat, a few anecdotes, and a summary of successes, failures, victories, and losses.
   Here's a short sample:

   As before, the Hurricanes and Spitfires found themselves dragged away in a high-altitude fight while the bombers ploughed on unmolested beneath. Bombs targeted Biggin Hill, Kenley and Hornchurch, where a successful last-ditch defence by No. 603 Squadron saw many of the bombers driven to jettison their loads wide of the aerodrome.
   Then, at 5.30pm, 250 more enemy aircraft were over Kent, leading to another huge fracas between 160 Me109s on the one side and fighters from Nos 46, 72, 111, 222, 501, 603 and 616 squadrons on the other. No 501 was hit hard, losing four Hurricanes, with two pilots wounded and one killed.
The early evening raids targeted Detling and Eastchurch, where the bomb dump was hit. Everything within 400 yards (365 metres)—buildings, drainage pipes, power and telephone cables and five aircraft—was destroyed. It was the final straw for Eastchurch; like Mansion before it, the airfield was declared non-operational.
   The most worrying development was that bombers were now reaching aircraft factories. At Brooklands the Vickers works that produced Wellington bombers was struck, and at Rochester the Short Brothers factory was hit, with civilians killed and buildings demolished. Fortunately for Fighter Command, the raiders missed the Hawker factory at Brooklands, which had been their primary target.
   It had been another gruelling day for Fighter Command. Over 700 sorties had been flown and 25 fighters had been destroyed, with another 4 badly damaged. Seven airfields had been hit, for which effort the Luftwaffe had lost twenty-two planes shot down and nine damaged.
   Once again, Dowding was forced to shuffle his forces. At Croydon, No. 111 Squadron from Debden took the place of 85 Squadron. The replacements were hardly rested and fresh. The pilots had been averaging four hours' sleep a night and they were down to seven aircraft. At Hornchurch, No. 54 Squadron was reaching the end of its endurance. Even Al Deere, famously calm, found himself twitching and snapping. One 54 Squadron pilot fell asleep into his breakfast plate.

   The author's approach proves not terribly unlike several other titles on the Battle of Britain; in particular, Bishop might owe a bit of a debt to Francis K. Mason's seminal Battle over Britain (which is listed in the bibliography).
   However, Bishop takes his book to another level with a plethora of sidebars and illustrations on a wide variety of topics from pilot's accounts to events on the home front to biographical notes to information on aircraft and weapons and much more. Illustrations abound throughout—practically every page sports some kind of photo or map or diagram or poster or other image—but these are all thoughtfully selected and integrated into the book. The illustrations never overwhelm the text, and this is no superficial pictorial history.
   Overall, quite a pleasing item. Recommended.

Read and submit feedback

Jones, Michael. Leningrad: State of Siege. London: John Murray Publishers Ltd, 2008

ISBN 978-0-7195-6922-7
xxii + 324 pages

Preface; Timeline; Bread Rations; Introduction; photos; maps; Epilogue; Notes; Bibliography; Index

   While Patrick Bishop's book amounts to one among many on the Battle of Britain, Michael Jones has chosen a topic with considerably less competition, at least in the English language, although no one could really rate the siege of Leningrad among the "forgotten" or "unknown" battles of the war.
   And the topic seems like a natural progression for Jones, following his excellent Stalingrad (and with his book on the Soviet winter offensive of 1941-1942 on the way as this review is being written). We thought quite highly of Stalingrad and awarded it an honorable mention as one of the best titles published in 2007. The focus in that book was very much combat in the city, and in particular the combat troops of the Red Army, measuring the impact of the battle on their morale and the impact of their morale on the battle.
   Leningrad, on the other hand, takes much more of an interest in life within the besieged city, not entirely ignoring military action, but emphasizing the suffering and endurance of the populace. In that respect, Jones follows much of the path of Harrison Salisbury's epic The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad. Even so, the Jones book has a more modern texture about it and features plenty of fresh first-hand accounts nicely stitched together to provide a rather staggering picture of the siege.
   As with his Stalingrad book, Jones also discusses some topics and events that would not have been welcomed under Soviet rule (and might still bring displeasure from Moscow). Stalingrad, for example, reported how the civilian population on 28 August 1942 engaged in an orgy of looting and panic-driven evacuation from the city, events suppressed in post-war Soviet histories. Leningrad brings up the topic of cannibalism, not something anyone would want to associate with the "heroic defense" of the city (and not a matter Salisbury shied away from). Jones also writes about the way the authorities gradually began to lose control of the situation as the city of St Peter slid into starvation and despair.

   A secret NKVD report stated blandly: 'The increase in the bread ration from 24 January did not improve conditions tor the city's inhabitants. As a result of difficulties with the food supply, the lack of water and electricity and insufficient firewood the mood of the population has deteriorated further.' Informers reported total disillusionment with the city's leadership. 'Mayor Popkov lies shamelessly about the situation in the city,' was one overheard comment. The war censor was intercepting more and more letters, noting the steady rise in 'negative' comments. One extract read simply: 'Leningrad has become a morgue—its streets are avenues of the dead. In every entrance way to every house there lies a pile of corpses. Rows of corpses line the streets. They are stacked up in hospitals. The factories are all frozen. We inhabit a dead city—without light, water or transport.'
   A thorough system of state censorship vetted all letters despatched from blockaded Leningrad. But the process of vetting was no longer deemed sufficient. From 25 January to 15 February 1942—the most critical period of the siege—all postal links between the city and the front were deliberately cut, in order not to demoralise the defending troops.
   As people stood in bread queues 700-800 deep, in the pitch dark of the early morning, the eating habits of the city's leaders became a regular topic of conversation. One person was overheard saying: 'Our rulers of course are full. They are sitting there, stuffed, at the Smolny. They get not only bread, but proper lunch and dinner. They don't care about us, about the starving people.' And an employee at one of the bakeries, named Silin, was reported as stating: 'The bureaucrats from the district party committee ran away when they saw the lines at the bread stores. They sit in warmth and light and stuff themselves, and do not see how people are suffering and dying. And when they see the food lines, they flee and start looking for the guilty little people. The little people aren't guilty—it is the bureaucrats who have created this mess. Zhdanov sits there and who knows what he thinks.'
   In the secret copy addressed to Leningrad's leader, this last sentence was underlined by Andrei Zhdanov himself, showing his sensitivity to what was being said about him. He also marked, for punitive action, the name of a book-keeper at the Musical Comedy Theatre who was overheard remarking: 'The people are starving, but they bring Zhdanov cocoa in bed.'
   Rather than take urgent action to improve the food situation, Leningrad's regime now devoted its resources to hunting down a 'counter-revolutionary organisation' that was 'seeking to exploit the food situation for anti-Soviet ends'. On 29 January the NKVD reported triumphantly that 'the insurrectionary group has been liquidated'. The 'insurrectionaries' were in fact staff at a medical clinic, their ringleader a doctor who had circulated the latest statistics on illness and death rates within the city. Their crime was to accuse the city's leaders 'of failing to take timely measures to store food within the city'.

   For our taste, the relative dearth of information on military operations means Leningrad doesn't rank as high as Stalingrad, but this remains a brutally engrossing tale, well told, and certain to find favor with many readers.

Read and submit feedback

Forczyk, Robert. Leningrad 1941-44: The Epic Siege. Botley, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2009

ISBN 978-1-84603-441-1
96 pages

Chronology; photos; maps; tables; diagrams; sidebars; Aftermath; Bibliography; Index

   The Leningrad book by Michael Jones weighs in at almost 350 pages. The Leningrad book by Robert Forczyk measures only 96 pages. Nevertheless, Forczyk packs far more information about military operations into his effort. On the other hand, he has little to say about the inhabitants during the siege, and cannibalism isn't one of his strong suits.
   Osprey numbers Leningrad 1941-44: The Epic Siege as "Campaign Book number 215," and it follows the same basic pattern as the other two hundred-plus softcovers in the series, including: Opposing Plans, Opposing Commanders, Opposing Forces, Aftermath, and Battlefield Today, all thoroughly illustrated in the familiar Osprey style.
   Like the other books in the Campaign series, Forczyk's Leningrad contains a Chronology, as does Jones (although he calls it a Timeline). Comparing the two can be instructive regarding the similarities and differences between the two. Forczyk presents two solid pages (at two columns per) with about 43 entries. Jones has three pages amounting to about 35 entries. Where Jones emphasizes information such as "First reports of dysentery outbreak in Leningrad" and "All able-bodied citizens clean the city's streets and courtyards" and "Food supply and distribution breaks down in the city," Forczyk goes with entries such as "1. Panzer-Division captures Krasnoye Selo" and "I. AK captures Krasnogvardeisk" and "2nd Shock Army and 67th Army link up north of Siniavino, establishing a small land corridor to Leningrad."
   As the Chronology indicates, Forczyk writes mostly about combat operations. Here's an example of his work:

   As the fighting around Leningrad began to ebb in mid-October 1941, both sides considered their options. With most of its armour and air support gone, Heeresgruppe Nord lacked the strength to break into the city but the emaciated Soviet 42nd and 55th armies lacked the strength to break out. A period of attritional stalemate, reminiscent of the Western Front in World War I, settled over the front as the first snow fell on Leningrad on 14 October. Both sides received modest reinforcements: Leeb received five Fallschirmjaeger battalions from 7. Flieger-Division to augment the flimsy defences on the Neva River, while Fediuninskiy's 54th Army on the Volkhov received the half-strength 3rd and 4th guards rifle divisions.
   The Stavka insisted on breaking the blockade as soon as possible, which meant another pincer attack on Siniavino from the 54th Army and the NOG. Meanwhile, the OKH sought measures to accelerate Leningrad's strangulation and it believed that Heeresgruppe Nord still had the strength to advance east and capture Volkhov and Tikhvin, thereby severing the rail lines that supported the Lake Ladoga barge traffic. Leeb opted to commit his last mobile strike force—four divisions of XXXIX AK (mot.) and three infantry divisions of I AK—to penetrate the seam between the Soviet 4th and 52nd armies near Chudovo and advance north-eastwards to capture Tikhvin.
   The German offensive began on 16 October and after four days of fighting, achieved a major breakthrough. Despite awful terrain, poor weather and 30cm of snow on the ground, 12. Panzer-Division was able to advance over 60km within 12 days and Tikhvin was finally captured on 8 November. Without this rail junction, the food situation in the city became critical. However, the seven German divisions involved in the offensive had suffered 10,032 casualties in a month. Both men and vehicles were spent and the German logistic system couldn't get adequate food, fuel or ammunition through the icy trails to Tikhvin. Generalleutnant von Arnim took command at Tikhvin and gathered his available forces into a hedgehog defence of the town and hoped that the Soviets were too weak to take advantage of the German predicament.
   Meretskov was brought in to take command of the 4th Army and to orchestrate the 52nd and 54th armies for an immediate counterattack. The Stavka gave Meretskov three full-strength divisions from the Trans-Baikal and Far East military districts.
   Meretskov began a concentric attack upon the German hedgehog in Tikhvin on 12 November, while the 54th Army attacked the German I AK on the northern side of the salient and the 52nd Army attacked XXXVIII AK on the south side. Meretskov's offensive gradually drove in both German flanks and elements of the 126. and 254. Infanterie-Divisionen were surrounded. German supply lines to Tikhvin collapsed and Arnim had to resort to emergency air re-supply of ammunition.
   With the German flanks crumbling, Meretskov launched an all-out attack on Tikhvin on 4 December and four days later Arnim abandoned the town. Falling back to the Volkhov, the ten German divisions established a new from by the end of December. However, these ten divisions had suffered a total of 21,530 casualties, including 4,600 dead. Furthermore, both 8. and 12. Panzer-Divisionen were burnt out, leaving Heeresgruppe Nord with no mobile reserves. After the successful recapture of Tikhvin, the Stavka reorganized the Soviet forces in this area and created the Volkhov Front under Meretskov's command.

   Forczyk writes perfectly competent chapters about the siege and, as always with Osprey titles, the accompanying maps, diagrams, photos, and OBs add a great deal to the proceedings. There is, however, a 600-pound gorilla in the room, and he's not to be ignored. The 2002 award-winner from David Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944, weighing in at almost 700 pages, can't help but make Forczyk's Leningrad look puny by comparison.
   In many ways that's matching a featherweight book against a heavyweight book, resulting in a totally unfair comparison, but it's something readers need to keep in mind. Serious students of the operations around Leningrad during WWII will need to have access to the Glantz title. The Forczyk title does nothing wrong, and benefits from the relatively splashy graphics, but it's simply not a serious contender to become the go-to resource on the siege. It's an attractive little title with some interesting nuggets and it compares favorably to much of Osprey's Campaign line-up, which will probably be more than enough for many readers.

Read and submit feedback

Ehlers Jr, Robert S. Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaigns. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009

ISBN 978-0-7006-1682-4
xv +422 pages

Preface; photos; maps; tables; Notes; Bibliography; Index

   Of the four books examined here, all better than average, Targeting the Reich stands out possibly as the best and certainly as the most scholarly. It also stands out from the others in another way, covering an unusual topic not tackled by many authors. Given those two qualities, it's no surprise the book is also the least derivative of the lot.
   Despite uncounted shelves of books covering the Allied strategic bombing effort in Europe, none delve into the matter quite like this. The first five chapters (each relatively short) deal with the development of air intelligence in World War One and through the inter-war years while the next two look at the early stages of WWII. As it warms up, this seems as much about bureaucracy as about air war. In a few places, it tends to rehash the same old controversies, such as a lengthy description of the internal disagreements leading up to the Transportation Plan to support Overlord.
   Nevertheless, Ehlers always returns to the theme of intelligence, noting, for example, how some Allied air leaders remained flexible enough to change their opinions about the Transportation Plan based on intelligence, damage assessment, and other evidence. The author also has much to say about senior airmen (such as Arnold, Spaatz, Portal, Tedder, Harris, etc) and how their views were shaped—or not—by intel. Bomber Harris in particular comes off especially poorly in this area: "His real failures in the intelligence arena were, first, his unwillingness to keep an open mind about the reports he saw, and more importantly, his intransigent position in favor of city bombing even after the transportation and oil offensives had so clearly succeeded."
   The heart of the book comprises the final three chapters (amounting to about 150 pages). Ehlers hits his stride as the stories of photo reconnaissance and signals intelligence become completely intertwined with the bombing campaigns, although the alphabet soup of intel and advisory committees can still require some deciphering.

   By September 1944, there was no doubt about the decisive nature of the transportation offensive, and ground-survey teams soon set to work drawing lessons from it. The ex post facto damage reports they produced drove an iterative learning process put to good use during the 1944-1945 transportation campaign against the Reich.
   These teams had four goals: to ascertain the accuracy of analyses produced during the campaign, to determine how operations could have been improved, to discover how well munitions worked against different targets, and to apply lessons learned to future attacks. There were four teams involved: the Bombing Analysis Unit (BAU), directed by the AFAF (later SHAEF) but staffed primarily by British intelligence specialists; the USAAF Air Evaluation Board (AEB—predecessor of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey); a French Operational Research Section unit; and small USAAF teams surveying bomb damage from missions flown by aircraft assigned to their commands. The latter went in first and fed reports to their owning commands, the BAU, and the AEB.
   One of these teams was a Third Bombardment Division unit led by Major Mark Brown, the division's chief photo interpreter. They studied their units' bombing of marshaling yards such as the one at Trappes; petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage sites such as Gennevilliers, a major facility outside of Paris; and bridges such as the railroad crossing at Amizy. They took photos, interviewed workers, and produced damage assessments. These provided a wealth of information on bombing effects. For instance, the railroad bridge at Amizy yielded important information about hidden structural damage. The bridge was bombed by forty-five aircraft carrying 118 2,000-pound general-purpose bombs fused 1/10th second in the nose and 1/40th second in the tail. There were no hits but two near misses at one approach to the bridge. Although reconnaissance cover showed no damage, the bridge was seriously damaged. Shock waves and earth movement caused by near misses pushed the west abutment 13 inches to the east, shearing rivets anchoring the ends of the bridge and pushing them apart by 7 inches. Thus, the bridge would require major repairs before it could be used for fast and heavy traffic. Huge craters made by 2,000-pound bombs with this fuse combination—60 to 70 feet in diameter and 20 to 30 feet deep—also tore up tracks and grade around the bridge.
   There were three important lessons here. First, not all serious damage is visible, especially in vertical, as opposed to oblique, photographs. Second, effort required to fill in large craters and repair track had to be considered when making judgments about time requirements for bridge repairs. Third, watching traffic patterns closely after such an attack, whether by sending reconnaissance aircraft over the target to observe traffic visually, by analyzing vertical or oblique photos over a period of days, or by relying on special operations teams, would reveal whether there was hidden damage impeding use of the bridge.

   Among other fascinating threads, Ehlers similarly looks at how the Allies kept careful tabs on German fuel production, storage, distribution, and consumption, and chose their targets accordingly. In some ways the author makes it sound as if all this intel and assessment and planning and targeting began to resemble a gigantic puzzle or wargame strangely distant from the daily and nightly drone of bomber engines over Germany.
   Although no dramatic saga of bombs and blood, this is an excellent, serious addition to the history of the air war in Europe and a welcome change of pace from the non-stop flood of aircrew stories. We would also welcome a substantial volume of this nature dealing with the stupendous logistical effort required to support the strategic bombing campaign, how it was organized, what difficulties were encountered, and what lessons learned.
   In the meantime, it's easy to recommend Targeting the Third Reich for its unique approach to the bomber offensive.

Read and submit feedback

   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the publishers.
   Thanks to the publishers and their distributors for providing these review copies.

Reviewed 8 November 2009
Copyright © 2009 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone