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ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6
x + 486 pages

Acknowledgments; Preface; maps; photos; Chapter Notes; Bibliography; Index

Appendices: German OB; Soviet OB; German Tank Strengths; German Tanks by Type; Structure of SS Panzergrenadier Divisions; Panther Tank Units; German Casualties; Waffen-SS Officers; Comparison of Strategic Reserves; Rank Equivalents; Glossary

   Everything you learned is wrong! Atoms are not the indivisible building blocks of the universe. Pluto is not a planet. Prochorowka was not the largest tank battle of World War II.
   George Nipe has nothing to say about sub-atomic particles or dwarf planets, but he's all over the "myth" of the Battle of Prochorowka. He pinpoints the original fabrications as coming from Soviet General P.A. Rotmistrov's 1960 study in Russian, Tankovoe Srazhenie Pod Prokhorovkoi. According to Nipe, Rotmistrov intentionally falsified the account and inflated the number of tanks engaged and panzers destroyed. Paul Carell in turn used Rotmistrov's work as the source for the Kursk portions of the original German edition of Scorched Earth. From that point on, a succession of writers took the falsehoods as gospel and propagated stories of flaming Soviet tanks ramming Tigers in a head-on collision of armor in the largest tank battle in history.
   After more than fifty years of misinformation from a series of books about Kursk and Prochorowka, Nipe tasks himself with setting the record straight.

   Following the publication of Scorched Earth, almost all authors writing about the Eastern Front or Kursk used Carell's account and [Martin] Caidin's fiction as a basis for their description of Prochorowka, some even repeating sections of one book or the other almost word for word. When the corps and divisional records of SS divisions on the Eastern Front were catalogued by the National Archives and became available on microfilm in 1978, they remained neglected, and their treasure trove of facts was ignored. Even a cursory study of these records reveals that many aspects of the Soviet account of the battle of Prochorowka are suspect at the very least and fictional at worst.

   On the other hand, while Nipe quite rightly recites a litany of authors who have mis-stated the reality of the battle, a few recent works have moved much closer to the facts. Nipe doesn't mention—and his bibliography doesn't contain—some of those newer books whose authors pretty much got the story straight. For example, in 1997, Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943 by Walter Dunn—despite a few mistakes—clearly didn't swallow all of the old rigamarole. Similarly, in 2000, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis by Zetterling and Frankson utilized many of the same primary sources as Nipe and reached many of the same conclusions. In 2004, The Battle of Kursk by Glantz and House arrived as a very strong volume about the battle that could hardly be considered perpetrating the old Rotmistrov - Carell myth. Valeriy Zamulin's new Demolishing the Myth also largely exorcises Rotmistrov's ghost.
   In terms of numbers of AFVs engaged and destroyed—one of the central fabrications of Rotmistrov and one of the issues Nipe puts under the microscope—the figures have certainly shown marked improvement in the literature over the last ten or fifteen years, including the titles mentioned above. In our review of the Zetterling and Frankson book, we compared extracts from multiple volumes (including an earlier book by Nipe) in that regard. Here we reproduce the relevant portion of that review.
   (The spelling of Prochorowka, by the way, is all over the map. In this review we're going with Nipe's usage, except when quoting extracts from other authors who use different forms of the name.)

---

Zetterling and Frankson. Kursk 1943, p 102, 107-109:

   First the extent of the battle of Prokhorovka must be defined. Our definition is that the clash started on 12 July and ended on 16 July. It involved II SS-Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps on the German side, while the Red Army had three armies involved in the fighting (69th Army, 5th Guards Tank Army and 5th Guards Army)....
   If the strength for 12 July is used, it can be concluded that the [III Panzer Corps] probably had no more than 135 tanks and assault guns available for the Prokhorovka battle. ...[O]n the evening before 12 July the II SS-Panzer Corps had 294 tanks and assault guns operational of which 15 were Tigers (no Panthers or Ferdinands, not even in workshops)....
   It seems that against the German III Panzer Corps, at least 150 Soviet tanks were newly committed on 12 July, while at least 450 tanks were hurled against II SS-Panzer Corps. Also a further 100 joined in against the II SS-Panzer Corps on 13 July, on the northern side of the Psel. As we have written earlier the 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps had 187 tanks together and, if we assume that at least 120 belonged to 2nd Guards Tank Corps (80 versus II SS and 40 versus III Panzer), these figures will be obtained....
   Depending on how one prefers to define the battle at Prokhorovka, it involved from 294 German (II SS-Panzer Corps) and 616 Soviet AFV (those engaging II SS-Panzer Corps) up to a maximum of 429 German and 870 Soviet AFV....
   Tank losses have often been described as equally severe for both sides but this does not match the reality. The German losses in destroyed tanks were very small compared to the losses suffered by the Red Army. The II SS-Panzer Corps lost 36 tanks and assault guns between 5 and 23 July of which at least 19 were destroyed before Prokhorovka. Accordingly, the II SS-Panzer Corps cannot have lost more than 17 during Prokhorovka.
   The III Panzer Corps, which had less armour than II SS-Panzer Corps, seems to have had higher losses. During the period from 11 to 20 July, it lost 37 tanks and assault guns, but not all units of the corps took part in the Prokhorovka battle.
   Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army reported that it had lost 222 T-34, 89 T-70, 12 Churchill and 11 assault guns up to 16 July. These were total write-offs. This gives a total of 334 destroyed Soviet tanks and assault guns, which can be compared to, at most, 54 German tanks and assault guns destroyed. This means the Soviet tank losses were at least six times higher. In fact, since more German units are included in this calculation than actually took part in the Prokhorovka battle, while not all Soviet units are included, the real ratio was even higher.

---

Glantz and House. The Battle of Kursk, p 151-152, 275, 414:

   Given the attrition of the penetration battle, by 10 July the II SS Panzer Corps' strength had fallen to fewer than 300 tanks and assault guns, and Army Detachment Kempf's III Panzer Corps numbered fewer than 200. On the Soviet side, General P.A. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army eventually controlled five corps totaling 830 tanks and self-propelled guns. ...[A]bout 572 [German and Soviet AFVs] met on the field of Prokhorovka itself. (Note: Calculated as 172 tanks and assault guns of Leibstandarte and Das Reich and just over 400 tanks and self-propelled guns of Rotmistrov's 2d, 18th, and 29th Tank Corps....)
   German armor losses in Citadel are more difficult to pin down.... Considering repaired armored vehicles, these figures indicate that [II SS Panzer Corps] lost between 60 and 70 tanks on 12 July (at Prokhorovka).... (Note: Finally, during the battle for Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost over 400 of its 840 tanks and self-propelled guns....)

---

Dunn. Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943, p 154, 158:

   Given the attrition of the previous seven days, the combined strength of the 2nd SS Corps was probably much less than 400 operational tanks and assault guns including 70 Tigers....
   The first echelon of the [Soviet] attack was formed by the 18th, 29th, and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, a total of at least 450 tanks.... The second echelon included the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and 2nd Tank Corps with about 300 tanks....
   Both sides had suffered heavy losses. The SS Panzer Corps claimed 249 Soviet tanks destroyed or captured on July 12.... A total of 200 tanks were lost by the 5th Guards Tank Army. General Pavel A. Rotmistrov estimated that each side lost 300 tanks, probably accurate for the Russians and high for the Germans.

---

Nipe. Decision in the Ukraine, p 32, 60-61:

   The 5th Guards Tank Army was made up of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.... In addition, the 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps were attached to Rotmistrov's army by 11 July. Most authorities agree that the 5th Guards Tank Army, including the two attached tank corps, probably had 850 tanks, of which 500 were T-34s. The rest were lighter T-70s and a few Lend-Lease Churchill tanks....
   II. SS Panzerkorps...reported that the three divisions had a total of 211 running vehicles [but not counting assault guns] on the eve of the battle for Prochorovka. "Totenkopf" had 94 operational tanks, "Leibstandarte" 56 and "Das Reich" 61, including 7 captured T-34's. There were only 15 SS Tigers still combat ready and available for action on that date, ten of which belonged to "Totenkopf"....
   The net loss from the number of operational tanks [of II. SS Panzerkorps]...was thus a total of 48 tanks [on 12 July]. The SS tank losses at Prochorovka were however, somewhat heavier than 48, the discrepancy almost surely resulting from the continual return of tanks to operational status after having been repaired from earlier damage. ...[A] rough estimate can be made that about 70-80 tanks were lost for the day by II. SS Panzerkorps....
   However, Rotmistrov's army lost approximately 600-650 tanks on 12 July in actions against II. SS Panzerkorps as well as Breith's divisions [of III Panzerkorps]....

---

The Soviet General Staff. The Battle for Kursk, 1943 (originally published in 1944), p 222, 228:

   [German units attacking toward Prokhorovka] consisted of three SS Panzer Corps divisions (Adolf Hitler, Death's Head, and Das Reich), 17th Panzer Division units, and also the 168th Infantry Division. This grouping numbered more than 600 tanks, including more than 100 heavy tanks ('Tigers') and self-propelled 'Ferdinand' guns....
   By the beginning of combat operations the 2d Guards Tatsinskaia Tank Corps and the 2d Tank Corps, which had a total of no more than 200 tanks...were subordinated to the 5th Guards Tank Army.... Thus the 5th Guards Tank Army had 793 tanks, including 501 T-34 tanks, 261 T-70s, and 31 'Churchills', and therefore, with respect to the number of tanks, the correlation of forces was approximately equal, although the enemy had qualitative superiority, especially in heavy tanks and self-propelled 'Ferdinand' guns....
   As a result of five days of combat, the Germans lost around 300 tanks [and] 20 self-propelled guns....

   More recently (originally published in Russian in 2005, translated into English earlier this year), Demolishing the Myth by Valeriy Zamulin also includes many pages analyzing the same data. After slicing and dicing all the figures in many different patterns, he boils down all the numbers to a pithy summary Here's what this mythbuster has to say:

Page 525

   Of course, the correlation of available tanks between the two sides was of decisive significance in the Prokhorovka engagement. The 5th Guards Tank Army (including the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps) had 909 tanks and 42 self-propelled guns on its roster at 1700 11 July, of which 96 tanks and five self-propelled guns were still en route to the assembly areas, and 24 tanks were under repair. However, in the account of the 5th Guards Tank Army's combat operations in the period between 7 July and 24 July, the headquarters staff reports that the army had, together with its attached formations and units of reinforcement, 793 serviceable tanks on 12 July, including 501 T-34, 261 T-70, and 31 Mk-IV Churchill tanks; 45 self-propelled guns; 79 76mm guns and 330 45mm anti-tank guns; 495 82mm and 120mm mortars; 39 BM-13 rocket launchers; and 1,007 anti-tank rifles. So this account maintains that 838 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in combat operations, beginning on 12 July (this number, obviously, doesn't include the 96 tanks that were still en route to the assembly areas and the 20 tanks that weren't able to be repaired by this time, though three self-propelled guns have appeared from somewhere compared to the data in Table 19).
   Of course, not every unit in the 5th Guards Tank Army participated in the fighting on 12 July. According to my own calculations, based upon the numbers presented in the operational reports of the tank regiment, tank brigade and mechanized brigade commanders (which are confirmed by corresponding documents) and presented in Table 21, there were 808 serviceable tanks and 32 self-propelled guns in the units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army on the morning of 12 July, for a total of 840 armored vehicles. Of these 840 armored vehicles, only 642 tanks and 30 self-propelled guns took direct part in the fighting on 12 July, or 77% of the total number of serviceable machines (see Line 33, Table 21).

Page 528

   So, just how many tanks took part in the "famous brawl on the tank field" southwest of Prokhorovka? The analysis of combat documents and calculations indicate, that with consideration for the two tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army on the one side, and the SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte and elements of the SS Divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf of the II SS Panzer Corps on the other side, then a maximum of 368 tanks and self-propelled guns took direct part in the fighting southwest of Prokhorovka on 12 July on our side, and on the German side, not more than 150 tanks and assault guns. So altogether, a little more than 500 tanks and assault guns clashed southwest of Prokhorovka, and no way could it have been 1,200 armored vehicles, much less 1,500 tanks and assault guns.
   Some historians might argue that the 2nd Guards 'Tatsinskaia' Tank Corps and all of the SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich should be added to these totals. If however the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the remaining elements of Das Reich can also be considered participants of the fighting on the "tank field", then the number of tanks and self-propelled guns that participated in the combat on 12 July 1943 does not exceed 700.

Page 530

   It is commonly known that one of the main criteria used to measure the level of development of operational art, tactics, command, staff work, and troop training is the level of losses given a known correlation of forces and means in an engagement or battle. The question of losses is a sensitive one in our [Soviet and Russian] historiography. Censorship did not permit the open publication of information about Soviet combat losses. Almost a half-century passed from the end of the war, before the veil of secrecy was finally removed from this topic—when the first statistical research on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, combat actions and military conflicts was published under the title Grif sekrenosti sniat ["The seal of secrecy has been removed"]. For example, in order to explain and justify the defeat suffered by the Red Armies in the initial period of the war, the military censorship of 1944 concealed from the people a "terrible truth"—the number of tanks in the Red Army prior to the Nazi invasion!

Page 532

   In the II SS Panzer Corps on 13 July, there were 131 serviceable tanks and assault guns remaining of the 422 with which it had started Operation Citadel. In Army Group Kempf's III Panzer Corps, according to Engelmann, on 15 July there remained 69 operational tanks and assault guns out of the initial 310. Thus, as it turns out, of the 294 serviceable tanks and assault guns in the II SS Panzer Corps on the evening of 11 July, 163 armored vehicles were lost to the corps in the fighting on 12 July as damaged or destroyed. This figure is just a little larger than the one offered by Il'ln above (153). The III Panzer Corps lost approximately 51 to 58 tanks between 12 July and 14 July. If we assume that on 12 July, the day of heaviest fighting, the losses comprised no less than 30 to 35 tanks and assault guns (60% of the losses between 12 and 14 July), and 15 (50%) of these were totally destroyed, then we can estimate that the II SS Panzer Corps and the III Panzer Corps together lost 193 tanks and assault guns on 12 July (including 20 that were unable to be repaired and put back into service). This amounts to 47% of the 414 serviceable tanks and assault guns available on the evening of 11 July.

Page 536 - 538

   In 1993, the 50-year withholding period concerning the Red Army's operational documents from the battle of Kursk expired, and the figure for the 5th Guards Tank Army's unrecoverable losses began to appear in publications—323 tanks and self propelled guns. This information is contained in a 5th Guards Tank Army headquarters' document, "Findings on the condition, losses and captured material of the units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army on 16 July 1943," which was prepared on 17 July 1943 and signed by the chief of staff Major General V. N. Baskakov and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Torgalo. Aggregate data for the period 12-16 July (inclusively) for all five tank and mechanized corps, which took part in the Prokhorovka engagement, are shown in Table 28. Unfortunately, the document doesn't isolate the losses on 12 July, so it is difficult to put together a precise and clear picture of the combat worthiness of the army's corps and the condition of their equipment after the so-called meeting engagement of 12 July. However, without this snapshot of the 5th Guards Tank Army's condition, it is impossible to understand the logic driving the course of events after 12 July.
   On the basis of operational documents from the headquarters of the tank regiments, tank brigades and mechanized brigades that took part in the counterattack, I've managed to compile a composite table of the losses of the formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army for 12 July. Unfortunately, only incomplete returns are available for the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps on 12 July, so there was no possibility to establish the losses on 12 July of that corps (in the Russian Federation's Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, all the operational and combat documents for the formations of this corps have still not been unearthed). Referring back to Table 21, with only incomplete data for the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, records indicate that the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 359 tanks and self-propelled guns on this day. Thus, in one day, the army lost 53% of the tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the counterattack.
   Again referring to Table 21, with the additional information on irrevocably destroyed armor that could not fit within the confines of the table, the losses of the individual corps that were involved in the fighting on the "tank field" over the single day of 12 July comprised the following: the 29th Tank Corps - 153 tanks and self-propelled guns (77% of those that took part in the attack), including 103 tanks that were irrecoverably destroyed; the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment - 19 self-propelled guns, of which 14 were irrevocably destroyed; the 18th Tank Corps - 84 tanks (56%), including 35 irrevocably destroyed; the 2nd Guards Tank Corps - 54 ranks (39%), including 29 irrevocably destroyed; and the 2nd Tank Corps - 22 tanks (50%), with 11 irrevocably destroyed.
   Altogether the four tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns, of which 193 and 14 (207), respectively, were irrecoverably destroyed. The total losses of the II SS Panzer Corps and the III Panzer Corps on 12 July likely amounted to 193 tanks and assault guns, including 20 that were written-off as total losses. According to German historians, the II SS Panzer Corps lost 153-163 tanks and assault guns, including five that were written-off, and another 55 that required major repair.
   One can also try to compare the overall losses of the opposing sides in armor for the day of 12 July. According to data provided by scholars of the Russian Institute of Military History, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost a total of approximately 500 tanks and self-propelled guns damaged or destroyed. Unfortunately, the source for this estimate is not given. Possibly, this number includes the 420 damaged vehicles in the repair pool, with the exception of 112 tanks that required only minor repair (207 irrevocably destroyed + 308 requiring major repairs = 515). In this case, the ratio of losses in tanks and self-propelled guns on the "tank field" corresponds to 2.5:1 in favor of the Germans.

   As to Blood, Steel, and Myth, Nipe devotes a chapter to some serious bookkeeping exercises regarding numbers of AFVs involved and lost. While certainly not the only part of his big, serious investigation of the battle, it's a subject that's clearly a high priority for him. Like Zamulin, Nipe runs all the numbers through his abacus in various patterns. Plucking out some of his paragraphs allows the conclusions to be summarized this way:

Page 427

   As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, Hausser's corps never, at any time, possessed six hundred Panzers, not even before the battle had begun, when the three SS divisions were at the peak of their tank strength. The corps records show that on the night of 4 July, the eve of Operation Citadel, Leibstandarte had 111 operational Panzers, while Das Reich had 116 and Totenkopf possessed 125 Panzers. Thus, according to II.SS-Panzer-Korps records the three divisions of Hausser's corps possessed a total of 352 Panzers on 4 July, a number which includes command tanks and Tigers. The records of 4.Panzerarmee for the same date confirm these numbers.
   By the evening of 11 July, the night before Prochorowka, the tank strength of the three divisions had decreased significantly due to normal combat losses and mechanical breakdowns. Das Reich and especially Leibstandarte, which had borne the brunt of offensive operations up until that point, had suffered significant losses. Leibstandarte possessed five Panzer IIIs, forty-seven Panzer IVs, four Tigers, and seven Befehlpanzer for a total of only sixty-three tanks. Das Reich had thirty-four Panzer IIIs, eighteen Panzer IVs, eight captured T-34s, a single operational Tiger, and seven Befehlpanzer for a total of sixty-eight tanks. Totenkopf had retained much of its tank strength and also had repaired many of its previously damaged tanks, reporting that it had 101 operational tanks on the eve of the battle for Prochorowka. Obviously Hausser would have been delighted to have had 600 tanks on 12 July, but in fact his corps possessed only 232 operational Panzer III/IVs and Tigers. This number includes twenty-one regimental or battalion Befehlpanzer or command tanks. Thus, the three SS divisions actually entered the battle with a total of only 210 combat tanks, including Tigers.

Page 432

   From the above analysis of the orders and battle reports of II.SS-Panzer-Korps and additional supporting information from 4.Panzerarmee records and personal accounts, it is clear that the notion of two masses of armor crashing together in a swirling tank battle west of Prochorowka is a fantasy. When Rotmistrov's 18th and 29th Tank Corps emerged from the corridor, they did not collide with a mass of six hundred SS tanks approaching simultaneously from the east. In fact, only Leibstandarte had any tanks in the western half of the corridor, and these sixty-three Panzers were deployed behind the front, in positions extending from Hill 252.2 to the Swch. suydjdkdoo Oktjabriskij area. Many of the division's tank crews were fixing breakfast or just awakening, as described by Ribbentrop. Wisch's tankers were merely waiting for Totenkopf's Panzer thrust to have the desired effect upon the Soviet defenses west of Prochorowka before launching their own attack.
   The 18th Tank Corps encountered 88s and Totenkopf Panzergrenadiers emerging from Wassiljewka when it came out from the Psel corridor, but it did not meet any German tanks until it swerved to the south and was shot up by Leibstandarte's four remaining Tiger tanks. The 29th Tank Corps' 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades encountered only the seven tanks of Ribbentrop's 6./Kompanie edging forward over the crest of Hill 252.2. The three surviving tanks of Ribbentrop's decimated company were eventually joined by the rest of Leibstandarte's tanks. Ribbentrop's handful of Panzers were the only German tanks moving forward at the onset of the battle within the corridor on 12 July. Rotmistrov's lengthy, detail-filled description of his army's battle with hundreds of German tanks on the morning of 12 July, accepted as fact by nearly every writer who penned histories of the Eastern Front for sixty years, was an elaborate fiction.

Page 436-437

   The question remains as to what were the actual losses of the three SS Panzer divisions during the battle of Prochorowka. It would seem that an accurate calculation of battle losses could be found by merely subtracting the number of operational tanks possessed by the three divisions on the night of 12 July, after the conclusion of the fighting, from the numbers of tanks the corps possessed on 11 July. Unfortunately, the task of arriving at an accurate number of tanks lost is not that simple for several reasons.
   Due to unknown causes the corps records do not have an operational tank report from Leibstandarte for the evening of 12 July although the division's reports for 11 July and 13 July are available. It is thus necessary to arrive at an approximation of the division losses by subtracting the 13 July total from the 11 July figure. This is an unsatisfactory method, but alternatives are lacking. On the evening of 11 July, Leibstandarte reported that it had a total of five Panzer IIIs, forty-seven Panzer IVs, four Tigers, and seven Befehlpanzer for a total of only sixty-three Panzers. The report for 13 July states that the division had five Panzer IIIs, thirty-one Panzer IVs, three Tigers, and seven Befehlpanzer for a total of forty-six operational tanks. Since the division's Panzergruppe engaged in only brief fighting on 13 July, it can be assumed that losses for that day were light and the number of operational tanks did not change significantly from the previous day's total. Therefore, its tank losses for 12 July, as nearly as can be determined, were approximately seventeen tanks.
   The records show that Das Reich had more operational tanks on 13 July, the day after the battle than it possessed on 11 July, the day before Prochorowka. Das Reich's operational tank report to the corps for 11 July stated that it possessed thirty-four Panzer IIIs, eighteen Panzer IVs, one Tiger, and eight T-34s for a total of sixty-eight operational tanks, including seven Befehlpanzer. On the evening of 12 July, following the conclusion of the battle for Prochorowka, the II.SS-Panzerkorps daily report to 4.Panzerarmee indicated that the division had seventy-six tanks, an increase of eight vehicles.
   This increase in operational tanks is explainable only by accepting the fact that the division's Panzergruppe did not engage in heavy combat with Rotmistrov's army in the corridor. This conclusion is supported by the corps records....
   The total tank losses for [II.SS-Panzerkorps] 12 July were approximately sixty-two Panzers, which is a far cry from the hundreds of tanks claimed by Rotmistrov and other sources. Of course, losses of seventy or more Tigers were impossible because the only Tigers in the sector were the four belonging to Kling's Tiger company, which did not enter the Psel corridor at any time during the fighting.

Page 438

   [A] comparison of the number of tanks lost by the opposing formations in the Psel corridor results in a very different conclusion. In order to compare losses, it is necessary to determine how many tanks actually fought in the corridor on 12 July. This can be accomplished with some degree of accuracy.
   The Soviet tank formations that were actually engaged in combat in the confines of the corridor consisted of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, which possessed about a total of about 360 tanks of all types. Leibstandarte had a total of only sixty-three Panzers. Therefore, the Soviets entered the battle with a substantial numerical advantage of almost six to one. In the first tank-versus-tank engagement, which took place between Ribbentrop's company and the 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades, the odds were even more one-sided. During the battle between Ribbentrop's seven tanks and the 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades, with about 130 tanks, the odds were 18 to I in favor of the Russians.
   Given such a substantial superiority in numbers, if the Soviet tank formations were truly superior to the SS tank crews, then it could have been predicted that German losses would have been catastrophic. Soviet losses would have been expected to be correspondingly light. However, in fact, the very opposite occurred. Even though the Russian attack took the Germans by surprise, with all of the attendant benefits, the tank losses of the 29th and 18th Tank Corps were very heavy while Leibstandarte only lost seventeen tanks on 12 July. There are several accounts of Hausser counting nearly 100 knocked-out Russian tanks in the Hill 252.2 sector alone and marking each hulk with chalk to keep an accurate count. The German claims were apparently fairly accurate, and heavy Soviet losses are essentially confirmed by Glantz and House, who state that the two Soviet tank corps had only 200 surviving tanks after the battle, from an 11 July total of 360. Simple subtraction shows that the two corps lost approximately 160 tanks in the battle with Leibstandarte. This is a loss ratio of more than nine destroyed Soviet tanks for every knocked-out German tank.
   Of course, not all the Soviet tanks destroyed in the sector were knocked out by SS Panzers. An unknown number were knocked out by German infantry or by anti-tank guns. Some were hit at long range by Totenkopf 88s during the attack upon Wasiljewka, and other were disabled or destroyed through Stuka attacks as they rolled through the Psel corridor.

Page 441

   If one counts only the Russian tanks engaged in battle between the Psel River and the railroad embankment west of Prochorowka, and in the sectors immediately adjacent to the corridor, which is the "classic" area of the battle, the total number of Soviet tanks in that area was about 520 tanks.
   On the German side, Leibstandarte's sixty-three Panzers, dispersed between Hill 252.2 and Oktjabriskij, were the only German tanks committed to battle in the corridor or in the sectors immediately adjacent to the corridor. The division did not receive any reinforcements during the day from either Heer or other SS divisions, and thus the total number of German tanks committed to the battle was sixty-three. Totenkopf's entire Panzer regiment was of course north of the Psel River, driving towards the Karteschevka road, while Das Reich's Panzer battalion remained at Oserowskij until it ambushed the remaining elements of the Soviet tank thrust past Kalinin, late on 12 July.
   Far from a total of 1300 to 1500 tanks, there were probably significantly fewer than 600 Panzers and Soviet tanks actually involved in combat in the sector where Rotmistrov and Vasilevsky claimed to have witnessed the battle between 1500 tanks fighting at close range. This was a total which was equaled or exceeded on many occasions during the fighting on the Eastern Front and even on the Western Front at times. While 580+ tanks is a substantial amount of armor, it does not make the battle of Prochorowka the greatest tank battle of all time.

   These excerpts make clear that calculations of numbers of vehicles involved and lost must depend on several important definitions, such as:

• The geographical boundaries of the battlefield

• The date or dates included

• The units engaged

• Types of vehicles (tanks, assault guns, self-propelled artillery, half-tracks) counted

• Types of losses (written off, damaged but recovered and subsequently repaired, damaged but remained at the front, etc)

   Although it's difficult to determine exactly how each book deals with those important definitions, and thus reconcile all the figures—henceforth, every new publication about Kursk should include an interactive spreadsheet—Nipe's new work clearly takes a minimalist approach to determining the scope of the "head-to-head" armored engagement on 12 July. Had his calculations been broader and more inclusive, his numbers would have been closer to those derived by some other authors. However, his analysis indicates that essentially Leibstandarte alone took the brunt of 5th Guards Tank Army's assault, meaning that merely 63 panzers engaged approximately 520 Soviet AFVs. Despite the unbalanced ratio of armored vehicles committed to the "tank field" at Prochorowka, Nipe maintains the division—and thus the SS corps as a whole—suffered only 17 panzers written off within those narrowly defined confines (geographical, temporal, etc) on the 12th, while Soviet losses amounted to roughly 160 AFVs destroyed in the same small area on that date. This disparity he chalks up to German tactical and technical superiority, noting in particular lack of radios in Soviet tanks, four-man crews (with tank commanders doubling as gunners), and the Soviet practice of charging into battle with tanks buttoned up, making it difficult to observe the field of combat.
   It's also worth noting that, although 5th Guards Tank Army suffered crushing losses and failed to gain its tactical objectives, the headlong attack proved to be an overall success, blunting the SS operations, essentially halting the German offensive, and turning the strategic tide.
   Interesting as Nipe's math may be, his pages of bookkeeping in the final chapter represent only a small part of his hefty volume. Blood, Steel, and Myth represents a complete history of the southern arm of Operation Citadel, albeit predominantly from the German point of view. As would be expected, he opens his book with a chapter describing how the front attained its mid-1943 configuration, followed by a chapter on preparations for the offensive. The next twelve chapters delve into the nitty-gritty of daily fire and movement, utilizing on-the-spot reports from the units involved and higher headquarters. In that way, Nipe measures the actual progress of the battle meticulously according to what the German commanders—and their staffs—knew and transmitted up the chain of command.
   Most of what Nipe writes describes combat and maneuver at a tactical and operational level, but he also interjects occasional information about individual tanks and soldiers. Here's a short example:

   The success of the Tiger company during the fight was not without cost. Tank commander SS-Obersturmfuhrer Schutz was badly wounded by a shell splinter while he was out of his tank conversing with another tank commander, and he turned over command of the tank to gunner Werner Wendt. Another tank commander, SS-Unterscharfuhrer Arthur Bernhard, was killed by a direct hit upon his turret cupola by a heavy anti-tank gun shell.

   Despite the book's title, the daily chapters encompass the full extent of the southern arm of Operation Citadel, including XLVIII Panzer Korps and III Panzer Korps as well as II SS Panzer Korps. Nevertheless, the SS panzers receive the most attention, and the engagement at Prochorowka features the beefiest chapter. All the chapters contain a brief summary, complete footnotes, excellent maps, and terrific photographs. In addition to the very thorough text, the visual and physical aspects of Blood, Steel, and Myth make the book stand out among all the other volumes covering the same events.
   The author already covered much of this ground within his 1996 book, Decision in the Ukraine (which dealt with a larger piece of the front and a longer span of time). His newer title, however, concentrates more specifically on Operation Citadel. The new book is also the product of further research and diligent analysis of the situation around Kursk. For example, the earlier book took the position that heavy Soviet tank losses and absence of local reserves, coupled with tactical superiority of German panzer divisions and relatively light losses, meant Citadel had a reasonable chance of success if the operation had not been halted, likely cutting off "...the Russian armies in the western section of the bulge which included the remnants of 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards, 40th, 60th, 65th, and 38th Armies." The new book reverses that assessment, determining that Soviet reserves were indeed too strong and too well-positioned to allow anything more than the most localized German successes.
   Because Nipe's work is fairly one-sided, intentionally focusing as it does on German plans and actions, despite its very high level of quality it would be difficult to recommend it as the one and only book about Citadel to read or own. Don't miss this one, but it's probably best studied in conjunction with The Battle of Kursk by Glantz and House as well as Demolishing the Myth by Zamulin, with the latter in particular offering a Soviet counterpoint to Nipe when it comes to misrepresentations, fabrications, legends, and fiction surrounding the campaign.
   Whether or not you have room for all three books on your shelf, Blood, Steel, and Myth looks like one of the best new releases of 2011, and every serious student of the Second World War will want to take a look.
   Highly recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from RZM or its distributor, Casemate.
   Thanks to Casemate for providing this review copy.

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Reviewed 15 January 2012

Copyright © 2012 by Bill Stone
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